german.html
Under the intriguing heading, "After Century in a Log Cabin, Emma Buck
Dies at 100 or 101," the NY Times ran an affecting
obituary
the other day for Emma Buck, who died on the Illinois farm "originally
settled by Miss Buck's maternal great-grandparents,
Christian and Christina Henke, German immigrants from East Friesland
who came by boat from New Orleans and settled in western Illinois,
about 35 miles down river from St. Louis, in 1841."
What caught my eye was that Ms. Buck was described in the piece as
"speaking in a thick German accent." That's a dramatic reminder of how
tenacious foreign languages could be in rural America in the 19th
and early 20th centuries. It's unimaginable that any child born today
whose great-grandparents immigrated to America before the Second World
War would still be speaking English with an accent -- in fact such a
child is almost certain to grow up knowing no more of his or her
ancestral language than the names of a few ethnic dishes, at best. But
that's the specter
Semantic
Compositions considers in a thoughtful post entitled "Huntington
contra
Nunberg," which contrasts some of the things I have said
about English-only in a recent LanguageLog
post
and an earlier
article
in
The American Prospect with
the views offered by Samuel Huntington in his recent book
Who
Are We? (The post is the third of a four-part discussion of
Huntington, of which the other parts are
here,
here
and
here.)
As SC notes, Huntington acknowledges that patterns of Spanish retention
suggest that Hispanics are following the same pattern of linguistic
assimilation that earlier generations do -- though, as the Times
obituary reminds us, a lot more rapidly than people did a century ago.
But Huntington also suggests, as SC puts it, that "this time it's
different." SC offers a cogent summary of Huntington's arguments:
Looking at Mexican immigration patterns
since 1975, Huntington
identifies several features which are distinctly different from
previous generations of immigrants: substantially higher proportions of
illegal immigration than any other ethnic group, high regional
concentration (most notably in the Southwest , Florida, and New York
City), persistence (no significant closing of the borders has occurred
in the past 30 years), and historical presence (unlike all other
migrant groups, Mexicans have a plausible ownership claim to American
territory grounded in historical facts), and finally, a government
which encourages the mindset that emigrants are still Mexicans first
and foremost.
SC's response to this is too complex and nuanced for me to summarize
here, but he winds up giving credance to the
possibility of the specter that
Huntington raises, though allowing that "It is probably 30-40 years too
early to attempt to verify these claims
empirically." And in his fourth and final
post,
gives a qualified endorsement to some of the symbolic measures that
Huntington advocates -- a roll-back of Executive Order 13166, for
example, which mandates the accommodation of LEP speakers for programs
receiving federal funding (apart from the provision of emergency
services), and an end to offering driver's licence tests in languages
other than English.
The point about licences SC bases on the assertion that
In most states [driver's licenses]
remain exclusively the privilege of
citizens. American-born citizens presumably are brought up speaking
English; naturalized citizens are either presumed to have learned
enough English to pass a basic examination, or to be too old to acquire
adequate English skills.... The notion that a test in English
permitting a privilege
with life-and-death consequences is an unreasonable imposition on
people who theoretically have undertaken to learn English is itself a
mocking of the idea that English was learned. To the extent that
American society requires mobility, and this represents a handicap to
the economic opportunities of non-English-speakers, Huntington might
well rejoin that this is an excellent method for deciding between the
validity of his analysis and Geoff Nunberg's. If Nunberg is right, this
sort of policy reform should ultimately only serve as a barrier to
those immigrants who are too old to learn English; if Huntington is
right, the number of citizens driving illegally should skyrocket.
This example is worth considering. For one thing, I don't know whether
most states restrict the issuance of driver's licenses to citizens --
frankly, that claim surprises me -- but I do know that there is no such
requirement in many states with large immigrant populations, like New
York and California. And a good thing, too. When I'm driving my
daughter to school in San Francisco, the last thing I want to run into
-- figuratively or literally -- is a driver who is ignorant of
the rules of the road because he or she had insufficient competence in
English to take the license exam. Here as elsewhere, that is,
making it harder for LEP residents to access various privileges and
services doesn't impost a burden merely on them.
More generally, the argument against giving driver's licences to those
with limited English proficiency, like the argument for rolling back
13166, rests on some questionable assumptions. First, it assumes that
immigrants will learn English only if that becomes a means to attaining
certain legal privileges and government services, rather than out of an
interest in acquiring the cultural and economic benefits that English
proficiency confers -- and by implication, it suggests that immigrants
are too ignorant or lazy, or too much under the thrall of native
rabble-rousers, to recognize those advantages. Hispanics are right to
bristle at that implication, which has no grounding in fact.
Second, it assumes that a language learned for these reasons alone
would be the vehicle for inculcating a stronger sense of identification
of the national culture. (There have been many cases in which states
have been able to impose a national language on minorities who were
otherwise reluctant to learn them -- you think of the Slovaks in
Hungary, the Hungarians in Slovakia, the Catalonians, and the Irish --
but it's hard to think of any instance in which that has enhanced the
sense of identity with the national culture, in the absence of broader
cultural and economic opportunity.)
Third, as I suggested in my earlier post, it presumes that English
itself can be the bearer of the values implied by the phrase
"Anglo-Protestant creed" -- a kind of irredentist Herderianism that
linguists, at least, will recognize as a persistent fallacy in thinking
about the relation between language and national identity. Somehow,
that is, a people doing their daily business in English will
naturally come to identify with the majoritarian cultural
values it stands in for. Tell that to the Irish.
In fact, English is too useful and important to imagine that any
immigrant group would be willing to turn its back on it in order to
maintain a marginal, ghettoized existence. Whether the acquisition of
English will continue to bring with it a sense of belonging to a
national culture depends entirely on the economic and social
opportunities that assimilation offers to immigrants, and on our
ability to refashion the idea of American citizenship to meet new
challenges. To date, the prospects are every bit as promising as they
were a generation ago -- and a lot more so than they were in Emma
Buck's day. Paul Starr put this point beautifully in the closing
paragraphs of his
review
of Huntington's book in the
New
Republic (unfortunately available only to subscribers):
There is a legitimate case to be made.. for a deepened sense of
common citizenship in America. If we want Americans to vote and to
participate in civic life, citizenship has to matter for them.
Huntington
is entirely right when he observes that "those who deny meaning to
American citizenship also deny meaning to the cultural and political
community that has been America." But he is wrong, repugnantly wrong,
about how to strengthen that community, and wrong also to suggest that
those who disagree with him about the means of doing so are betraying
the country.
In the book's foreword, Huntington
remarks that Who Are We? has been shaped by his identities as a scholar
and a patriot. But he has put distorted scholarship at the service of a
misconceived patriotism. The idea of building American identity around
an Anglo-Protestant revival would be entirely self-defeating. Far from
unifying Americans, Huntington's vision of America as a re-energized
Christian society would be deeply divisive. Samuel Huntington's
nightmare of an American crackup could come true, but only if more
people think as he does.
Posted by Geoff Nunberg at June 24, 2004 02:59 AM