Science vs. semantics
A letter in the
New York Times
of 8/6/05 (p. A26) opposes science and semantics in a way that will
strike linguists (who are already sufficiently annoyed by people who
say "but that's all just semantics", as if the meanings of words and
constructions weren't important) as very odd. It turns out that
there is an important distinction here, between (to use technical
language) technical language and ordinary language, which in ordinary
language is sometimes referred to as a distinction between science and
semantics. This is confusing, but I'm not sure what linguists can
do about it, any more than I know how to untangle the thicket of
meanings and uses surrounding the word
gender.
Here's the letter, from Richard P. Binzel, a professor of planetary
science at M.I.T., about whether the newly discovered celestial body
orbiting the sun, beyond Pluto and somewhat larger than it, should be
counted as a tenth planet (or whether Pluto should be demoted from
planetary status):
Re "Too Many Planets
Numb the Mind" (editorial, Aug. 2 [suggesting the demotion of Pluto]):
There is great difficulty in reaching a scientific
consensus on defining a "planet" because this is not a scientific
question. It is a question of semantics.
A semantic solution is best reached using a
historical context. Pluto as the "ninth planet" for eight decades
sets the historical precedent for what size should serve as the
dividing line for planetary status.
You imply that Pluto's planetary status is a
mistake. Modern trends toward inclusiveness across society argue
differently. To exclude Pluto as a planet would be a mistake.
Ten planets or more is a terrifically exciting and
inspiring prospect worthy of expanding the mind.
What we see here is a privileging of science -- and scientific language
-- over ordinary language, which for non-linguists is just "language",
"language" having "semantics" for its words. On this view, the
terminology of scientific (and other technical) disciplines gets its
meaning from the categories of nature; science "carves nature at
its/the/her joints", as they say. (I'm having some trouble
finding out who first put it this way. Philosophers regularly put
the expression in quotation marks, but they also regularly fail to cite
a source.) Meanwhile, in plain-ol' "language", what words mean --
their "semantics" -- is a matter of convention, mostly arrived at
through common practice, so that historical precedent is a relevant
consideration. (I am reporting on this view, not necessarily
advocating it.)
[E-mail has now rushed in with sources for the carving-nature image: Plato's
Phaedrus 265d-266a (of course it goes back to Plato!). Thanks to, so far, Aaron Boyden and Jamie Dreier; and to John Lawler, who supplied an echo from Chuang Tzu.]
But in fact, both in technical language and in ordinary language, we
have words and meanings. The meanings of technical terms are also
matters of convention -- explicit convention, rather than implicit as
in ordinary language. We also think, or hope, that we've fixed on
the "right" set of scientific concepts, so that, in combination with a
set of hypotheses about their relationships, they will allow us to
explain and predict phenomena.
What's at issue for Binzel -- correctly, I think, no matter how much I
cavil at his wording -- is whether the
CONCEPT of a
planet (referred to by a technical term
planet) plays a role in scientific
theories, or whether
planet
is only a word of ordinary language. (It could, of course, in
some sense be both. That is, the same phonology and orthography
could be used differently in the two domains -- usually because
ordinary-language words were borrowed as technical terms, with
different meanings:
fruit,
herb,
bug,
force,
mass,
element,
class,
group, and so on.)
Binzel in effect claims that there's no scientific theory in which
planets play a role; nothing of scientific significance would follow
from the classification of the new celestial object as a planet, or
from its classification as something else, for that matter. He's
saying that
planet is,
nevertheless, a useful word of ordinary language, and we can discuss
whether older conventions of ordinary language should take in this new
object.
On this question, there are arguments on all sides: for conservatism
(many object to abandoning material memorized in school) or for
generosity (Binzel's option, with its out-of-left-field appeal to a
wider notion of social inclusiveness as well as to the unsurprising
size criterion) or for retrenchment (the NYT's suggestion, using the
chemical composition of celestial bodies and the nature of their orbit,
as well as their size, as criterial). In the end, the people who
write textbooks will probably tip the scales in favor of one usage or
another. Remember, these are the folks who gave you indigo as one
of the "colors of the rainbow", not to mention the label
violet for purple. (They
didn't originate these usages, but they sure did make them the coin of
the realm.)
zwicky at-sign csli period stanford period edu
Posted by Arnold Zwicky at August 6, 2005 03:44 PM