Comprehensibility and standardness
Step 1: A language maven M contrasts two (roughly) equivalent variants
X and Y, labeling them standard and non-standard respectively (or, more
starkly, "correct" and "incorrect") and proscribing Y. This is
the
labeling phase.
Step 2: M attempts to justify the differential labeling (and the
accompanying proscription) by claiming that X has intrinsic virtues --
it preserves a distinction that's important for communication, it
avoids ambiguity, it's "logical", it's briefer, it's clearer, whatever
-- that Y lacks; Y is intrinsically inferior. This is the
justification phase.
Step 3: A linguist L objects to the justification phase -- sometimes
also to the labeling phase, but the central question here is the
validity of the justifications. L argues that the justifications
offered in favor of X over Y are ill-founded. In particular, L
argues that in practice Y does not impede communication or introduce
pernicious ambiguity.
This is a
rejection of the justifications, not of the labeling. (In
some cases L wants to dispute the labeling as well, but L rejects the
justifications for dispreferring Y in any case.)
Step 4: L will make a similar argument in case after case, concluding
that the standard variety is as it as a consequence of social,
cultural, and historical forces, not because of some intrinsic
superiority as a vehicle of communication. Having examined case
after case, L will note that each non-standard variant has its own
intrinsic values -- it makes a distinction that's important in
communication, it avoids ambiguity, it's more regular or is
simpler in some other way, it's briefer, it's clearer, whatever -- so
that the justifications are really beside the point. (But this
last step is important because it leads to the humane conclusion that
users of the language are all concerned, tacitly of course, with
communicative values; people who use non-standard variants are not just
sloppy, lazy, cognitively impaired simpletons who have, moreover,
perversely rejected the excellences of the standard.)
Step 5: Others now claim that L is maintaining (absurdly) that if
people can understand something, it's therefore standard; call this
"comprehensibility implies standardness".
This conclusion does not follow from what L
says; anyone who draws this conclusion deserves to fail Logic 101.
I believe that no linguist has ever said that comprehensibility implies
standardness, and also that no linguist has ever said that if a speaker
of a language says something on some occasion it's therefore standard
(in lay terms, "correct" or "grammatical"), an even more absurd claim
that Geoff Pullum rants about occasionally (most recently, in
passing,
here).
Certainly I have never said either of these things.
My
comments
on the special conditional form of English (sometimes called "the
subjunctive" or "the past subjunctive") have elicited the usual pile of
accusations that I am an anarchic, anything-goes, radical
relative-moralist academic who rejects standards in language (well,
this is usually framed in somewhat more polite language). What I
did was compare the special conditional form (call it form C) with the
ordinary past form (call it form T) as an expression of conditions
contrary to fact. In this use, form C is labeled by many critics
as standard and form T as non-standard. In fact, I think that
these labels are no longer accurate, but that wasn't the point of my
critique. Instead, I examined the justifications that appear in
handbook after handbook for proscribing form T in this use: that it
eliminates a distinction that is important in communication and induces
ambiguity. Against these claims, I noted that using form T in
this way simply doesn't produce difficulties in communication or
occasion troublesome ambiguities. You can maintain that form T is
non-standard, and we can discuss the evidence for that; you can choose
to use form C (as I do in many circumstances); but this talk about the
communicative virtues of form C and the communicative deficiencies of
form T is just beside the point. (I originally typed "is just
bullshit", and maybe I should have stuck with that.)
I did not say that form T used in counterfactual conditionals is
standard because people understand it so easily. I said that
specific claims about the communicative values of form C are not
supported by the facts of actual usage (in particular, the ease with
which people understand it), and that communicative values therefore
provide no justification for labeling form T in this use as
non-standard. If form T is in fact non-standard, that's
just a brute fact, having to do with which people use the variant in
what contexts and for what purposes.
I have no problem in labeling variants as non-standard, if they in fact
are, and I've done it many, many times here on Language Log (an awful
lot of the variants I study are non-standard) -- with the result that I
get a certain amount of e-mail from people who are shocked by some of
this labeling: how, they write, can I say that some variant is
non-standard, when it makes so much
SENSE? Why
should
theirselves be
non-standard? Why should
themself
used with singular antecedents (
Anyone
who shoots themself in the foot shouldn't be trusted with a gun)
be non-standard? Why, in fact, should
theirself in this use be
non-standard (in fact, doubly so)? All I can say to these
correspondents is: it just
IS. (Though in the
case of
themself it might not
be so for much longer.)
I understand that there are powerful bits of ideology at play here
(which lead to the expectation that standard variants have special
virtues, and then to the sort of e-mail I just described), but I feel
they need to be exposed and resisted. So I find myself
"defending" non-standard variants, and informal variants, and primarily
spoken variants, and innovative variants, and regional/social variants,
but not by claiming that they're standard, formal, written, etc.
Instead, I have the much more reasonable goal of noting system
(patterning, structure) in, communicative values for, and discourse
functions for these "low" variants as well as the "high" ones (and the
ones that are neutral with respect to the high/low poles). This
is something that linguists have done for a long time. (Not by
any means the only thing, but an important thing.)
A final note on form C. Jay Livingston writes to say, wryly:
You wrote: "But somehow
preserving the last vestige of a special counterfactual form has become
a crusade for some people."
If I was you, I wouldn't worry too much about it disappearing entirely.
This is an especially interesting example, because there seem to be a
fair number of people who have essentially no productive use of form C,
though they do have what are essentially relics of form C in a few
fixed expressions, like
if I were you
and
would that it were so,
which are learned as wholes. In an important sense, the
grammatical system of such speakers doesn't include form C, any more
than the grammatical system of modern speakers with
always and
towards (and non-standard
anyways) includes an adverbial
genitive, though that is the historical source of the final /z/ in
these items. That is, for these speakers, form C
HAS
disappeared entirely.
Posted by Arnold Zwicky at April 2, 2008 07:37 PM